CANNING SPAM: CONSUMER PROTECTION
OR A LID ON FREE SPEECH?
GRANT C. YANG1

ABSTRACT
The United States Congress recently passed the first federal
legislation to curb the influx of spam. However, the Controlling the
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (“CANSPAM Act”) left some measures to be enacted by the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”), and some consumers are calling for the Act
to have a broader reach and for the creation of a Do-Not-E-Mail
registry. Conversely, the FTC decided to delay the creation of a
registry and opted to assist in the development of a new
technological authentication system. This iBrief looks at the
current state of spam and explains that it is too early to tell whether
the effects of the CAN-SPAM Act warrant new anti-spam measures.
In addition, it points out that it is questionable whether the FTC’s
current authentication approach will be effective, and, thus,
considers the possible First Amendment challenges to a Do-NotCall registry as well as other possible anti-spam solutions. In the
end, this iBrief postulates that the most effective option might be for
the FTC to implement both a Do-Not-Email registry and an
authentication system.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
E-mail has become an integral part of life on the Internet, but like
many great communication media it has been tainted by unsolicited
commercial communications; unsolicited commercial e-mail is commonly
referred to as “spam.” Spammers recognize the convenience and efficiency
of e-mail, and make significant profits while interfering with consumer
usage. The economics of spam are fairly simple. A retailer’s goal is to
maximize profits by minimizing costs,2 and advertising is a cost.3 To
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maximize the effective use of advertising, the retailer casts as wide a net as
possible in a direct marketing scheme.4 Since the cost of spam is almost
negligible, it often makes sense to use e-mail as the primary advertising
medium.5
¶2
However, society bears a great cost as a result of spam. Recipients
of spam suffer because they, or their employers, must shoulder the
substantial cost of setting up complex mail servers, maintaining hard drives
to store the e-mail, and implementing spam filters.6 In addition, in the
workplace, spam can result in a significant loss of productivity.7 For
example, because spam is already estimated to constitute over half of all email traffic,8 there is a concern that if spam increases at its expected
exponential rate, companies will not be able to support the increased costs
of bandwidth and hard drive space.9 One study estimates that spam costs a
business $847 per employee per year in lost productivity alone.10
Furthermore, society will bear the cost of spam if e-mail becomes a less
useful form of communication.11
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This iBrief looks at the effects of current and proposed federal antispam legislation. In particular, it considers the possible implementation of a
Do-Not-Email registry or a new technological authentication process,
including possible constitutional and logistical challenges. In the end, this
iBrief postulates, the most effective option might be for the federal
government to implement both a Do-Not-Email registry and an
authentication system.
¶3

I. THE CONTROLLING THE ASSAULT OF NON-SOLICITED
PORNOGRAPHY AND MARKETING ACT OF 2003
¶4
Though many states had already enacted anti-spam laws, the United
States Congress’ first anti-spam action did not come until 2003, when it
passed the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and
Marketing Act of 2003 (“CAN-SPAM Act”);12 the CAN-SPAM Act was
signed into law by President Bush on December 16, 2003 and went into
effect on January 1, 2004.13 The CAN-SPAM Act largely delineates certain
requirements for sending commercial e-mail and proscribes ancillary
methods used by fraudulent spammers to harass consumers.14 Specifically,
it prohibits the use of false-header information15 and deceptive subject
headings,16 while requiring that the e-mail contain certain content, such as a
mechanism to opt-out of receiving future commercial e-mail from that
sender,17 a warning label if the commercial e-mail contains sexually
oriented material,18 and the sender’s physical postal address.19 The CANSPAM Act also prohibits many other fraudulent activities associated with
spam, such as utilizing open relays,20 hacking into computers to facilitate
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Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, § 2 (a)(2), 117 Stat. 2699, 2699 (2004) [hereinafter
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Id. at § 16.
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Id. §§ 4 & 5. For a concise summary of the requirements and penalties of the
CAN-SPAM Act, visit
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/canspam.htm (last visited Nov.
17, 2004).
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CAN-SPAM Act §§ 4(a)(3) & 5(a)(1).
16
Id. § 5(a)(2).
17
Id. § 5(a)(3).
18
Id. § 5(d).
19
Id. § 5(a)(5)(A)(iii).
20
Id. §§ 4(a)(2) & 5(b)(3). An open relay is an insecure computer used by third
parties to retransmit e-mail messages. See Open Relay, WHATIS.COM, at
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci782509,00.html (last updated
July 19, 2004).
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the transmission of spam,21 registering for false e-mails or domain names,22
address-harvesting, and dictionary attacks.23
¶5
The CAN-SPAM Act was one of many proposed federal
legislations, and has been highly criticized for not being harsh enough in its
requirements and limitations. 24 For example, California State Senator
Bowen (D-Redondo Beach) criticized the CAN-SPAM Act’s adoption of an
opt-out mechanism, which she found to be weaker than her opt-in
proposal.25 The CAN-SPAM Act has also been criticized for not
recognizing a private cause of action.26 Rather, actions must be brought by
state Attorneys General,27 Internet Service Providers,28 or primarily, the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).29 Despite these criticisms, it is too
early to tell whether additional measures must be taken by either the FTC or
by Congress.

21

CAN-SPAM Act § 4(a)(1). Hacking into a computer is gaining accesses to a
computer without authorization to use to send multiple transmissions using that
computer.
22
Id. § 4(a)(3). Registering for a false e-mail or domain name is to use a false
name to represent oneself when registering for an IP address or e-mail.
23
Id. § 5(b). Harvesting addresses is using some type of automated method to
parse web pages or other online forums to gather e-mail addresses. Dictionary
attacks are an automated method of creating random e-mail addresses using
letter combinations that are sent to an e-mail server and then determining which
addresses are valid, based on responses from the e-mail server. See Grant Yang,
CAN-SPAM: The First Step to No-Spam, 4 CHI-K. J. INTEL. PROP. 1, 5 (2004), at
http://jip.kentlaw.edu/art/volume%204/4-1-2.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
24
For a listing of proposed legislation from the past three years, see
http://www.spamlaws.com/federal/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
25
Susan Kuchinskas, California Senator Slams ‘Can Spam’, CLICKZ NEWS,
Nov. 14, 2003, at http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3109531 (last visited
Nov. 17, 2004). An opt-in system requires recipients to explicitly request to
receive the e-mail; whereas, in an opt-out system, spammers may send e-mails
to all but those who explicitly opt-out. Sorkin, supra note 9, at 374. Many
commentators have argued that an opt-in approach is better for consumers partly
because opting-out takes too much time and also confirms the e-mail address to
the spammer. See Richard C. Balough, The Do-Not-Call Registry Model is not
the Answer to Spam, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 79, 86–87
(2003).
26
CANNING SPAM: Federal Government Preempts State Legislation
Regarding Unsolicited Commercial E-mail Messages, GORDON & GLICKSON
LAW FORUM, at
http://www.imakenews.com/ggalert/e_article000222696.cfm?x=a2JKslM,a18jw
lg9 (last visited Sept. 27, 2004).
27
CAN-SPAM Act § 7(f)(1).
28
Id. § 7(g)(1).
29
Id. § 7(a).
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The FTC has some flexibility to enact and administer additional
spam regulations,30 such as creating a Do-Not-E-Mail registry31 or requiring
additional labeling.32 Such additional regulations may be warranted, as the
success of the CAN-SPAM Act in its first year has been much-debated.
Already, AOL cites a 27% decline in spam and an almost 50% decrease in
daily spam-related complaints from customers over a period from February
20 to March 17 of 2004.33 On the other hand, some reports have indicated
that spam volume has risen since 2002.34 It may take some time to
accurately measure the effect that the CAN-SPAM Act will have on the
quantity of spam. Furthermore, there are mixed reviews from the industry
regarding whether the CAN-SPAM Act will ever be effective.35
¶6

II. DO-NOT-E-MAIL REGISTRY
¶7
One potential expansion of the CAN-SPAM Act, which may
implicate First Amendment issues, is to implement a Do-Not-E-Mail
registry. The CAN-SPAM Act gave the FTC six months from its date of

30

Id. § 13.
Id. § 16.
32
Id. § 11(2).
33
AOL Chew Fat on Sliced Spam, REUTERS, Mar. 19, 2004, available at
http://news.com.com/2100-1024-5176278.html?tag=nefd_hed (last visited Nov.
17, 2004).
34
Spam Volume Keeps Rising, NEWS.COM, Sept. 1, 2004, at
http://news.com.com/Spam+volume+keeps+rising/2100-1032_35339257.html?tag=nefd.top (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
35
Compare CAN-SPAM Act: Full Committee Hearing, 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of Ronald Scelson, Scelson Online Marketing) (stating that “CAN
SPAM Act is working and working well”), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1199&wit_id=2094
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004), with CAN-SPAM Act: Full Committee Hearing,
108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Peter Brondmo, Senior Vice President, Digital
Impact, Inc.) (asserting that “the CAN Spam Act is unlikely to eliminate the
hard core spammers, especially those sending viruses and perpetrating
‘phishing’ attacks – the most dangerous form of spam”), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1199&wit_id=3438 (last
visited Nov. 17, 2004). In other words, some think the CAN-SPAM Act can act
as a deterrent, whereas others view that the difficulty of finding and catching
spammers will not deter the particularly hard-core spammers. Therefore, even
with a cause of action, it is argued that spammers may not be deterred.
However, this begs the question of whether harsher penalties are needed to deter
spammers from flagrantly violating CAN-SPAM; the current sentencing
guidelines for CAN-SPAM are already being criticized as too harsh by the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Paul Festa, Stiff Spam
Penalties Urged, NEWS.COM, Apr. 14, 2004, at http://news.zdnet.com/21001009_22-5191651.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
31
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enactment to study the feasibility and effectiveness of establishing a DoNot-E-Mail registry.36 In June 2004, the FTC released a report delineating
its findings, and advised against implementing a Do-Not-E-Mail registry at
that time.37 The FTC considered three potential types of Do-Not-E-Mail
registries: “a registry of individual email addresses, a registry of domains,
and a registry combined with a certified third-party email forwarding
service.”38 The first two types of registries are intuitive: that is, a user can
register an e-mail address or a domain name and spammers would not be
allowed to send to those addresses or domain names.39 The third type of
registry considered allows a spammer to submit his distribution list to an
FTC-approved third party forwarding service, which then matches the emails on the distribution list with those on the Do-Not-E-Mail registry and
forwards the spam to those users not on the registry.40 After considering all
three registry types, the FTC determined that there were significant security
and privacy concerns,41 general technical concerns,42 and obstacles to
enforcement.43
The proposal of a Do-Not-E-Mail registry has received popular
support from the general public.44 Some have even said that the registry is
integral to the CAN-SPAM Act’s success.45 Many spam opponents feel that
spam legislation should employ an opt-in mechanism,46 and the registry
¶8

36

CAN-SPAM Act § 9.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, NATIONAL DO NOT EMAIL REGISTRY: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS ii (2004) [hereinafter “REPORT TO CONGRESS”],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/dneregistry/report.pdf (last visited Nov.
17, 2004).
38
Id. at 13.
39
Id. at 14-15.
40
Id. at 15.
41
Id. at 15-23.
42
Id. at 26.
43
Id. at 23-26 (stemming largely from the difficulty of tracking spammers and
forcing them to obey the law).
44
Pamela Parker, Do-Not-Spam Proves Popular Concept, CLICKZNEWS, Dec.
23, 2003 (study showed that 84% of Americans were extremely or very likely to
register on a Do-Not-Spam registry), at
http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3292361 (last visited Nov. 17, 2004),
45
Do-Not-Spam List Is Crucial to Make Current Law Work, THE MERCURY
NEWS, Feb. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/opinion/7998096.htm.
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
46
Stefanie Olsen, California ‘Disempowered’ By Federal Spam Law,
NEWS.COM, Jan. 22, 2004 (stating that the Federal Spam law preempted the
stronger California anti-spam law which was opt-in and gave individuals more
power against spam),
37
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would make the CAN-SPAM Act a de facto opt-in law.47 Meanwhile,
others, like FTC Chairman Tim Muris, have expressed serious doubt about
the registry’s effectiveness.48 In addition, some opponents are concerned
that it would just give spammers millions of valid e-mail addresses to
spam.49
¶9
Most importantly, an effective registry must be robust in order to
counteract the weaknesses mentioned in the report. For example, use of
third-party intermediaries would provide the most security; however, the
FTC found that doing so would “deprive legitimate bulk e-mailers of key
marketing data.”50 The FTC further argued that the use of such a system
would increase the cost to legitimate marketers and take away “key
components to any marketing strategy – measuring the success of the
campaign and understanding the customer.”51 Thus, although a registry
would further protect consumer privacy, it also has the potential to impinge
on legitimate marketers’ First Amendment rights. To determine whether an
expanded Do-Not-E-Mail registry could withstand constitutional scrutiny, it
is helpful to examine the legal precedent provided by the recent judicial
challenge to the Do-Not-Call registry.
¶10
The Do-Not-Call registry is “a list containing the personal
telephone numbers of telephone subscribers who have voluntarily indicated
that they do not wish to receive unsolicited calls from commercial

at http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-5145849.html?tag=st_rn (last visited
Nov. 17, 2004).
47
A registry would require a one-time opt-out and thereafter the user would
need to opt-in to receive commercial e-mail.
48
FTC Chief’s Doubts On Do-Not-Spam List Remain, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar.
12, 2004, (Chairman Muris had expressed doubt about the registry even before
the passage of the CAN-SPAM Act), available at
http://www.wral.com/technology/2919192/detail.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2004); David Ho, FTC Chair: Do-Not-Spam List Won’t Help, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 19, 2003, available at
http://www.crn.com/sections/BreakingNews/dailyarchives.asp?ArticleID=44014
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
49
Janis Mara, FTC Requests Vendor Input on Do-Not-Spam List, CLICKZNEWS,
Feb. 24, 2004, at http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3316911 (last visited
Nov. 17, 2004). In fact, one scam website tried to set itself up as a registry in
order to fool people into providing their e-mail addresses. “Do-Not E-mail”
Site a Scam, U.S. Officials Say, REUTERS, Feb. 13, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-02-13-no-spam-list-scam_x.htm
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004). See also Marc Simon, The CAN-SPAM Act of
2003: Is Congressional Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail
Constitutional?, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L. 85, 93-94 (2004), available at
http://www.jhtl.org/V4N1/JHTL_Simon_Note.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2004)
50
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 37, at 28.
51
Id. at 30-31.
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telemarketers.”52 The Do-Not-Call registry, originally established under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,53 is a joint effort between the
FTC and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) under the DoNot-Call Implementation Act,54 and both agencies have promulgated the
rules governing the Do-Not-Call registry.55 Under the Do-Not-Call registry
regulations, telemarketers have up to three months to remove phone
numbers listed on the registry from their call lists; however, only personal
phone numbers may be listed56 and the list does not apply to nontelemarketers, such as political organizations, charities, telephone
surveyors, or companies with which consumers have an existing
relationship.57
In Mainstream Marketing Services Inc. v. FTC,58 the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently upheld the constitutionality of the
Do-Not-Call registry, holding that it did not violate the limited First
Amendment protection provided to commercial speech.59 The Supreme
Court uses a form of intermediate scrutiny in evaluating commercial
speech.60 In Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission,61 the
Supreme Court articulated a four-part intermediate scrutiny analysis used to
determine whether a government regulation violates commercial expression
under the First Amendment: (1) the speech must concern lawful activity and
not be misleading; (2) the government interest must be substantial; (3) the
regulation must directly advance that government interest; and (4) the
regulation must not be more extensive than necessary to serve that
¶11

52

Mainstream Mktg Servs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat.
2394 (1991) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §227 (1994)).
54
Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, § 3, 117 Stat. 557, 557
(2003).
55
16 C.F.R. §310.4 (FTC rule); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. Both agencies also
maintain their own websites regarding the Do-Not-Call registry. The FTC has a
website at http://www.ftc.gov/donotcall/, and the FCC has a website at
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/donotcall/. Registration is available at
http://www.ftc.gov/donotcall/.
56
Business-to-business calls are not covered by the Do-Not-Call registry. Q&A:
The National Do Not Call Registry, National Do Not Call Registry, at
https://www.donotcall.gov/FAQ/FAQConsumersNew.aspx (last visited Oct. 4,
2004).
57
Information for Consumers, National Do Not Call Registry, at
https://www.donotcall.gov/FAQ/FAQConsumers.aspx (last visited Sept. 29,
2004).
58
Mainstream Mktg Servs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
59
Id. at 1233.
60
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1047 (2d ed. 2002).
61
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
53
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interest.62 The Tenth Circuit applied the Central Hudson test and provided
four reasons why the Do-Not-Call registry is consistent with the First
Amendment’s requirements.63 The court’s reasoning readily applies to a
potential Do-Not-E-Mail implementation.
First, the Mainstream Marketing court emphasized that only core
commercial speech is restricted by the Do-Not-Call registry.64 The law
clearly defined the scope of content to include only commercial speech, and
as such, it fell within the constitutional purview of the Central Hudson test.
Similarly, the CAN-SPAM Act only targets commercial speech.65
However, the FTC could make this analysis more difficult if it pushes the
limit of its discretion concerning the implementation of a Do-Not-E-Mail
registry.66 For example, if the FTC expanded the registry to reach noncommercial political speech, the registry would not be protected by the
Mainstream Marketing precedent.67
¶12

¶13
Second, the court acknowledged that the government had two
justifiable interests, thus passing the second prong of the Central Hudson
test. The Do-Not-Call registry was meant to protect individual privacy in
the home and protect consumers against “fraudulent and abusive
solicitation.”68 The court stated that the home is a “personal sanctuary that
enjoys a unique status in our constitutional jurisprudence.”69 These interests
would also apply to consumers using personal e-mail. However, while the
Do-Not-Call registry only applies to personal phone numbers,70 an effective
Do-Not-E-Mail registry would also need to include business e-mail
addresses. Many of the costs of spam are incurred by businesses through
lost productivity and technology costs, and businesses generally invest more
in costly anti-spam programs than individuals do.71 Thus, under a
potentially expanded Do-Not-E-Mail registry, a court would have to also
determine whether decreasing the burden on businesses is a justifiable
government interest.
62

Id. at 566.
Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 358 F.3d at 1233, 1236.
64
Id.
65
CAN-SPAM Act § 4.
66
Id. § 9(a).
67
The Tenth Circuit explicitly stated that their opinion did not serve as
precedent for political and charitable callers. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 358
F.3d at 1233 n.2.
68
Id. at 1237.
69
Id. at 1233 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)).
70
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) (2003).
71
Deborah Fallows, Spam: How It Is Hurting Email and Degrading Life on the
Internet, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, Oct. 22, 2003, at 19, at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Spam_Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 23,
2004).
63
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Third, the Mainstream Marketing court addressed the issue of
choice, as the Do-Not-Call registry acts as an opt-in program that leaves
choice in the hands of the consumers.72 It found that the Do-Not-Call
registry materially furthers the government’s interests of combating the
danger of abusive telemarketing and preventing the invasion of consumer
privacy, thus fulfilling the third prong of the Central Hudson test.73 In this
same manner, a Do-Not-E-Mail registry would put the power to receive or
prevent spam in the hands of consumers. The CAN-SPAM Act states that it
forwards a substantial government interest in that it protects consumers
from the fraudulent aspect of spam and provides them the right to decline
commercial e-mails.74 Thus, a Do-Not-E-Mail registry would further the
government interest of protecting consumers by putting the power in the
hands of the consumer to determine whether or not to receive unsolicited
commercial e-mails.
¶14

¶15
Fourth, the Do-Not-Call registry was challenged under the last
factor of the Central Hudson test which requires that the commercial speech
regulation be “narrowly tailored,” but not necessarily the least restrictive
means.75 The Tenth Circuit found that the Do-Not-Call regulation is
narrowly tailored because it is a proportional response to the government
interest.76 The appellees in Mainstream Marketing, who were telemarketing
companies, contended that there were alternative approaches that could be
taken to fulfill the government’s interests; however, the court struck each of
them down. For example, telemarketers suggested that consumers could
make company-specific opt-out requests,77 but the court found that only
having a company-specific approach is “seriously inadequate to protect
consumers’ privacy from an abusive pattern of calls.”78 Telemarketers also
argued that the government could employ less restrictive technological
alternatives to stop unsolicited phone calls; however, the court recognized
that such alternatives would not only place the cost of unwanted calls on

72

Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 358 F.3d at 1233, 1238.
Id. at 1233, 1241-42.
74
CAN-SPAM Act § (2)(b); see also Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 358 F.3d at 1237
(finding that the government’s justifications of protecting individuals’ privacy
and fraudulent and abusive solicitation are “undisputedly substantial
governmental interests”).
75
Id. at 1237.
76
Id. at 1238. The Tenth Circuit found that “do-not-call prohibits not only a
significant number of commercial sales calls, but also a significant percentage
of all calls” and that commercial sales calls are exactly the type that Congress is
seeking to redress. Id. at 1242–42.
77
Id. at 1244.
78
Id.
73
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recipients, but would also be ineffective as technological advances have
been made to circumvent blocking techniques.79
¶16
In the same manner, spam advertisers may argue that there are
ample alternatives to implementing a Do-Not-E-Mail registry; however,
because spam and telemarketing have many of the same characteristics and
alternatives, the Mainstream Marketing arguments may also apply to a DoNot-E-Mail challenge.80 Under the current CAN-SPAM Act scheme a
consumer only has a company-specific opt-out option.81 It is questionable
how effective this option will be in stopping spammers, and it shifts the
burden to the consumer to opt-out of each company’s mailing list. This is
in contrast to the Do-Not-Call registry, by which telemarketers are charged
with removal of the phone numbers listed on the registry from their call
lists; however, only personal phone numbers may be listed82 and the list
does not apply to non-telemarketers, such as political organizations,
charities, telephone surveyors, or companies with which consumers have an
existing relationship.83
¶17
An effective Do-Not-E-mail registry would not only be narrowly
tailored, but welcomed by consumers because it would allow them to optout only once, similar to the Do-Not-Call registry.84 As with telemarketing,
there are many spam blocking technologies; however, they have proven to
be both costly and ineffective.85 The Tenth Circuit found a registry to be
the most efficient for consumers, and unlike the current scheme of the
CAN-SPAM Act, where an e-mail user can only opt-out from each
individual solicitation, a registry provides one easy means to “erect a wall . .
. that no advertiser may penetrate without [the registered party’s]
acquiescence.”86

79

Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1244–46.
81
CAN-SPAM Act § 5(a)(5)(ii).
82
Business-to-business calls are not covered by the Do-Not-Call registry. Q&A:
The National Do Not Call Registry, National Do Not Call Registry, at
https://www.donotcall.gov/FAQ/FAQConsumersNew.aspx (last visited Oct. 4,
2004).
83
Information for Consumers, National Do Not Call Registry, at
https://www.donotcall.gov/FAQ/FAQConsumers.aspx (last visited Sept. 29,
2004).
84
Whether or not this would be effective is also questionable, as suggested by
the FTC report; however, this minimally puts a law-abiding company on notice
and gives the enforcing agencies statutory means to protect the consumer.
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See Yang, supra note 23, at 30–35.
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Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 358 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Rowan v. Post Office,
397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).
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The Tenth Circuit correctly found that the Do-Not-Call registry was
constitutional, and a constitutional challenge against a Do-Not-E-Mail
registry would face many of the same issues. However, a successful DoNot-E-Mail registry would inevitably need to be a more encompassing
registry than a Do-Not-Call registry, given that a large amount of spam is
sent to both consumers and businesses87 and also because the general nature
of e-mail is such that users can check their personal or business e-mail
wherever they are. If only personal e-mails could be registered, the
nuisance aspect of spam could still occur in the home because the nature of
e-mail allows many users to frequently check their business e-mail from
home and vice versa.
¶18

¶19
While the Direct Marketing Association (“DMA”), one of the
appellees in Mainstream Marketing, decided not to appeal the Tenth
Circuit’s decision, the American Teleservices Association announced that it
would appeal the case to the Supreme Court88 and did so in May 2004.89
However, the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari.90 The Tenth
Circuit’s holding thus stands, and is not only instrumental in protecting
consumers but also serves as significant precedent for the Do-Not-E-Mail
registry.91

If created, a Do-Not-E-Mail registry would be more difficult to
administer than a Do-Not-Call registry,92 and it is possible that the FTC may
be “emboldened enough to create a do-not-email registry broader than the
¶20
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REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 37, at 1.
Caroline E. Mayor, Telemarketers Split on Appeal of Do-Not-Call, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 4, 2004, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A28821-2004Mar3&notFound=true
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
89
Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004),
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 14, 2004) (No. 03-1552).
90
Mainstream Mktg. Servs v. F.T.C.., 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 2004 WL 2050134 (2004).
91
In fact, both the DMA and the American Association of Advertising Agencies
oppose the creation of a Do-Not-E-mail registry. Declan McCullagh, Court
Upholds Do Not Call List, NEWS.COM, Feb. 17, 2004, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1028-5160690.html (last modified Feb. 17, 2004).
Furthermore, some experts believe that a Do-Not-E-mail challenge would track
a Do-Not-Call precedent. Id.
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REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 37, at 16. Some administrative problems
are: security/privacy concerns, difficulty in enforcement because of spammers’
abilities to hide their identities, difficulty in tracking spammers, difficulty
obtaining subpoenas to obtain the information necessary to file cases against
spammers, and the vast number of e-mail addresses. Id. at 15-26.
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telephone registry [and] . . . go for noncommercial e-mail.”93 If the FTC
created a registry outside the bounds of the Tenth Circuit’s holding, such as
one allowing the registration of business e-mails or the restriction of noncommercial e-mail, this could possibly incite marketing trade groups to
make First Amendment challenges. However, the costs of spam and
telemarketing are different and there are other significant justifications, such
as the nuisance of pornographic spam,94 which could justify farther reaching
provisions of a Do-Not-E-Mail registry.

III. OTHER SOLUTIONS SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE
¶21
Given the time necessary to study the effects of the CAN-SPAM
Act and the potential First Amendment challenges, Congress is not likely to
amend the Act to give it any more force. Therefore, the FTC is left to either
implement a registry or look to alternative non-statutory solutions, most of
which are not susceptible to attack under the First Amendment. For
example, an e-mail tax would severely hinder the cost-efficiency of spam,
and though it would have to pass intermediate scrutiny, 95 such a measure
would likely pass a First Amendment challenge because it would apply to
all e-mail.96 In addition, various Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have
proposed technical solutions to verify the validity of an e-mail and its
origin.97
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Id.
Unlike annoying telemarketing, pornographic spam affects individual
consumers; that may justify an argument for “privacy” equal to that of personal
e-mail. A Pew Research study showed that pornographic spam causes the same
embarrassment and emotional reaction that would be manifested in personal email, and in some situations may cause employees to lose their jobs. See
Fallows, supra note 71, at 29-31.
95
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 903
96
Id. at 903 (stating that “A law regulating speech is content-neutral if it applies
to all speech regardless of the message . . . . For example, a sales tax, applicable
to all purchase including of reading material, might have a significant incidental
effect on speech, but it is content-neutral.”). Similarly, a tax on all e-mail would
be similar to requiring a stamp on all postal mail. A person would have to affix
the stamp on regardless of the mail’s content. Also, due to the prevalence of email in all businesses with very little differential taxation on the press, it would
be unlikely that a tax would be construed as an unconstitutional special taxation.
See id. at 1123.
97
E-mail Identity System Proposed to Combat Spam, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb.
27, 2004, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/internet/02/27/email.origins.ap/index.html
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
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Many of the suggested technical solutions require some type of key,
authentication, or identification process.98 In fact, in its June 2004 report,
the FTC suggested that it will convene a Federal Advisory Committee to
consider an authentication process99 in lieu of a Do-Not-E-Mail registry.100
Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information
Center (EPIC), cautions that while digital certificates requiring
identification of a sender are allowable for commercial speech, they would
most likely violate First Amendment protections of political or religious
speech.101 However, while the Supreme Court has held that laws that ban
anonymity on political literature are unconstitutional, there would be a
question if this requirement of anonymity could be applied to technological
standards implemented by private ISPs, particularly when the
implementations are completely content-neutral.102 Most likely, unless ISPs
are regarded as state actors,103 those who send unsolicited e-mails would be
unable to make First Amendment challenges against ISPs,104 as the First
Amendment only protects against speech regulated by the government.105
Thus, if private ISPs and other technology companies take the initiative on
their own to create an e-mail standard, they would be able to defend against
First Amendment challenges.
¶22
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Id. at 36.
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Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center,
Testimony and Statement of Record Before the Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, May 21, 2003, available at
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visited Nov. 17, 2004).
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See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999);
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362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 1103 (“There is not a right to use private
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The Supreme Court has concluded that the First Amendment does not create
a right to use privately owned shopping centers for speech. Hudgens v. Nat’l
Labor Relations Bd., 424 US 507, 520-21 (1976). If ISPs were to be regarded as
an entity similar to a shopping center, where the general public has access to the
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CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 894.
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However, it is problematic to implement these technical
solutions.106 Furthermore, getting the major e-mail providers to agree on a
single protocol will be extremely difficult.107 The FTC, anticipating these
hurdles, is considering mandating an authentication protocol.108 A
government-imposed technological standard may not be advisable, but it is
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss those issues. Authentication may
even work best with a registry, rather than in lieu of a registry.109 Currently,
spammers can exploit the e-mail system because the identity of the e-mailer
is unverifiable.110 In the same way, a major problem with the Do-Not-EMail registry is the fear that spammers may illegally use the registry e-mails
to continue spamming while avoiding detection because of their inability to
be traced.111 If the FTC implements a Do-Not-E-Mail registry with an
authentication system in place, this may very well be more effective than
only implementing a registry.
¶23

CONCLUSION
¶24
Although many spam scholars are calling for the expansion of the
current CAN-SPAM legislation, there is still time to determine whether the
current legislation will make an impact on spam. The Spamhaus Project’s
Register of Known Spam Operations has found that 90% of all spam comes
from 200 spam groups.112 Some on the list, such as Bernard “Merlin”
Balan, who Canada.com News dubbed the “King of Spam,” have since
retired.113 However, the CAN-SPAM Act provides a Damoclean sword for
those spammers who wish to take Balan’s place among the spamming elite,
and has caused many to be wary of sending spam.114
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Hopefully, an authentication implementation will be able to stem
the increasing flow of spam. However, if the amount of spam does not
decrease, the statutory requirements of the CAN-SPAM Act will need to be
expanded and further expansion will undoubtedly test the limits of free
speech. Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the Tenth Circuit’s
decision stands as a significant precedent. An emboldened FTC may
consider creating an expansive Do-Not-E-Mail registry alongside an
effective authentication system, which together would add to the growing
arsenal in the war on spam. In fact, this may be necessary to appease the
various anti-spam organizations and corporations that are tired of fighting
an ever-increasing amount of spam.
¶25

visited Nov. 17, 2004). Alan Ramsky, one of the top 200 ROKSO spammers,
expressed his concern about the CAN-SPAM Act and stated, “You would have
to be stupid to try to violate [the CAN-SPAM Act].” Id.

